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When Drumheller received the draft of Powell’s UN speech, he importuned McLaughlin to drop the story. So were senior members of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND). Drumheller was particularly dumbfounded when Bush used the disinformation in his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003. Bush with the case for war, and refused to yield on rejecting the mobile labs story. But Alan Foley, the chief of WIN-PAC, the weapons intelligence center, was determined to provide George W. The chief of the CIA’s European Division, Tyler Drumheller, knew Curveball was mentally unstable and that he was trying to trade bogus information to the Germans for immigration status for himself and his family.ĭrumheller warned CIA leadership that Curveball’s information was false after it was cited in the tainted national intelligence estimate in October 2002. Curveball was handled by German intelligence and never vetted by the CIA, but the Germans warned that they could not vouch for him because he was a liar and an alcoholic. There was no reason to give any credibility to Curveball’s information because the Iraqi factories producing anthrax and botulinum toxin had been destroyed in Desert Storm. government and the mainstream media, particularly Judith Miller of the New York Times. “Curveball” was the brother of a senior aide to Ahmad Chalabi, who led the Iraqi dissident effort to feed disinformation to the U.S. The “Curveball” saga on non-existent mobile biological labs symbolized the corruption of the campaign. Fabricated information and single-source intelligence were central to the process. Powell’s speech and the CIA were wrong on every aspect of Iraqi WMD-nuclear, biological, and chemical. McLaughlin was the key advocate for the notorious “Curveball,” whose phony intelligence on mobile biological weapons was a key element in Powell’s speech six weeks before the start of the war. McLaughlin perverted the intelligence process, and tried to silence the chief of the Iraq Survey Group, David Key, who knew there was no evidence of strategic weaponry in Iraq. Tenet and McLaughlin lied to Powell in claiming there were multiple sources for sensitive information, but McLaughlin, an intelligence veteran of 32 years, was the ring leader of the campaign. Powell knew that Cheney had made numerous trips to the CIA to make sure that the intelligence would corroborate Bush’s decision to go to war. They gave deceitful briefings to various congressional committees they sponsored a specious National Intelligence Estimate in October 2002 they instigated an unclassified “White Paper” on the basis of the estimate to distribute on Capitol Hill before the vote to authorize force and they assisted Cheney’s desires. Tenet and McLaughlin played key roles from September 2002 to March 2003 in manufacturing intelligence to support a decision to go to war. They lied to him, and he never forgave them.
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But Powell was no match for the manipulation of CIA director George Tenet and deputy director John McLaughlin. The Cheney draft of a speech, written by his chief of staff, Lewis “Scooter” Libby, was a total distortion, and Powell ignored it. Powell believed he could deal with the CIA, just as he believed he had dealt with Vice President Cheney’s efforts to prepare his speech. Vice President Dick Cheney wanted Powell to deliver a speech to convince the American public and an international audience that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. Powell ignored the warnings from his chief of staff and the director of his Bureau of Intelligence and Research, not to allow the CIA to prepare his speech for the United Nations in February 2003. Biblical inscription in the lobby of CIA headquarters.įor nearly two decades, former secretary of state Colin Powell lived with the deceitful role he played in helping the Bush administration make its dishonest case for war against Iraq. (Tenet’s response to President Bush’s demand for intelligence on Iraq’s WMD to provide to the American people.} CIA director George Tenet, December 21, 2002. Photograph Source: Michael Gross – Public Domain